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“It is our opinion that the revolutions  
that are shaking the thrones of dictators  
are good for the Muslims, good for the mujahidin  
and bad for the imperialists of the West  
and their henchmen in the Muslim world. 
We are very optimistic and have great expectations 
of what is to come.” 
- Yahya Ibrahim1 
 
The ongoing conflict in Libya is a chance well perceived by al-Qa’ida (AQ) to finally gain a 
foothold in a country, whose leader in the past was highly successful by extreme violent 
means2 to suppress any opposition, particularly any Islamist or jihadist inspired opponents. 
Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has firmly ruled – and exploited – Libya ever since he gained power in 
1969. 3  The conflict in Libya as of now can be considered as a tribal war over 
regional/provincial control, with the epicenter being in Benghazi where peaceful protestors 
had endured harsh violent reactions by army, police and mercenary units loyal to Qadhafi. 
Perhaps as a logical consequence, Libyans in the eastern part of the country started 
defending themselves and as a result a civil-war scenario has since unfolded.  
Unlike other revolutions, particularly in Tunisia, Libya now is doomed being a war-zone, with 
NATO flying bombing missions in order to prevent a massacre of Qadhafi’s troops should 
they be able to regain control of Benghazi and other rebel strongholds. Reports of massive 
human rights abuse in the town of Misrata have since the outbreak of the revolution in mid 
February been documented.4 For AQ and the jihadi online sphere in general, the violent 
outbreak in Libya is a treasure grove. When the waves of social and mostly peaceful 
protestors set from Tunisia to Egypt, the typical jihadi propaganda machinery seemed 
incapable of adequately responding and now desperately tries to claim each and every 
revolution as their cause, for which they are conducting military and terrorist operations. 
 
New developments – the need to respond 
With the start of the social unrest in Tunisia which turned into riots against the regime of Ben 
Ali that subsequently led to his ousting in early 2011, the north African branch of al-Qa’ida5  
was quick to respond when its leader Abu Mus’ab Abd al-Wudud issued a message to 
                                                        
1
 Inspire, number 5, p.5, “Protest Focus”, published on 30 March 2011 –  “Featuring a Special Section: 
THE REVOLUTION”, http://www.archive.org/download/INSPIREn5/inspire5.pdf (30.03.2011 - applies 
to all referenced links, unless otherwise noted).  
2
 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/world/africa/06libya.html?_r=1 
3
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/819291.stm  
4
 http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/04/05/6413466-miseries-abound-for-besieged-libyans-  
5
 The al-Qa’ida branch in North Africa was established early 2007 after merging with the Algerian-
bound Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) and now calls itself al-Qa’ida in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 
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“support and aid the intifada of our people in Tunisia.” By simply terming it an intifada, the 
message implies a popular uprising with the potential of escalating violence on all sides. In 
this message, al-Wudud claimed that the people finally had disposed the “Pharaoh” and are 
on the verge of establishing an Islamic state, ruled by sharia-law and thus liberating the 
Muslims – independently of any reality in mainly secular Tunisia. This is the primary 
propagated goal of AQ that must be implemented for all Islamic countries. Showing the 
nature of AQ in general, al-Wudud was only able to offer violent means to peaceful and 
mostly secular protestors when he said “send us your sons, so we can train them in handling 
weapons and in order to acquire military knowledge.” AQ had hoped – and is now attempting 
similar ends in Libya – to hijack a legitimate protest movement with the claim AQ is a avant-
garde for the liberation of Muslims, having fought against these regimes for decades. In a 
similar move, the Arabic-language magazine Sada al-Malahim of the Yemeni AQ branch6 
called out to Muslims in Tunisia.  
This extreme violent AQ department, entrenched in a intensifying guerrilla war against the 
Yemeni government, fell in line with jihadi propaganda stating that Tunisia is somewhat of a 
first domino in a jihadist dream world of reestablishing the Islamic Caliphate.  
With the address to the “People of Tunisia” the Yemeni jihad magazine clearly propagates 
that “your jihad, your revolution is about the return of an Islamic state, based on justice, in 
order to drive the infidel secularists and the democrats into hell.”7  
As AQ´s agenda consists of ultimately re-establishing the Islamic Caliphate, it has 
propagated in the past of having already founded parts. This includes the "Islamic State of 
Iraq", the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" (in unison with the Taliban) or territories in 
Somalia, where the propagated implementation of Islamic rule shall serve as the first step in 
proclaiming another Islamic state. 
 
Just as the media of jihad attempt to capitalize on the events in Tunisia, and now Egypt as 
well, the North African AQ department is highly keen to issue statements of support to “our 
people in Libya.” Any damage to any Arab regime, defined by the jihadists as tyrannical 
rulers or idols is branded by jihadist media as a victory and as a part of AQ’s wider agenda.  
Every Arab revolution is a potential win for AQ and hijacked by the propaganda of the 
jihadists who attempt to picture a jihadization of the current unrest. With the intensifying of 
violence in Libya and the current airstrikes conducted by NATO, al-Qa’ida has regained 
some attention and openly seeks to support the military jihad against Qadhafi. The NATO 
intervention is considered yet another “politically-motivated adventure of the western 
                                                        
6
 Al-Qa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP had been founded in early 2003 in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and has reemerged in Yemen in January 2009 under the same name after successful 
Saudi counter-terrorist actions in the Kingdom. 
7
 Sada al-Malahim no. 16, p.3. The magazine was published 15 February 2011. 
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countries” who are “colonialists [that] do not want a solution for this country (…) but rather 
have plans to weaken this Islamic country in a war of attrition and then occupy its oil reserves 
through direct invasions.”8 Following the basic concept of "the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend", the airstrikes against the Qadhafi regime by NATO are portrayed by jihadist scholar 
Abu Muslim al-Jaza´iri as useful for the cause in Libya.9 This serves the purpose of the 
revolution, however, only for as long as NATO is “targeting Qadhafis troops without entering 
the Libyan territory [with ground forces].” But the western intervention is naturally not being 
trusted and thus the west has a history of “alleging to intervene for the protection of innocent 
civilians while they are the ones slaughtering civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan and are having 
innocents butchered by supporting the occupants of Palestine.”10 
 
The Libyan Factor 
Libyans have been active at the frontlines of jihad in the past decades. While numbers tend 
to differ, it must be noted that some of the most outstanding AQ operatives and leaders had 
been from Libya and are currently in a prominent position. Local jihad groups such as the 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) never had any chance of actually gaining any grounds 
inside of Libya with the regime of Qadhafi in place. In a perhaps logical move, most Libyans 
jihadists set out to Afghanistan in the 1980s11, participated in the Balkan wars in the 1990s12 
and are now, as of 2011, represented among the core leadership of AQ in 
Afghanistan/Pakistan. When the US-Army in the Iraqi town of Sinjar found documents of 700 
jihadi foreign fighters who joined AQ in Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007, 591 of 
these records provided the country of origin. These files, known as the Sinjar Files, indicate 
that roughly 250 fighters had been from Saudi Arabia with Libya ranking as number two 
(about 100 fighters) followed by Yemen and Algeria. According to the Sinjar Files, 19 percent 
of the fighters came from Libya, and Libyans ranked number one in regard of fighters per 
capita.13 Perhaps a surge of Libyan aspirants of jihad was set in motion after the announced 
merger of LIFG with AQ. This merger was expressed by the Libyan AQ leader and military 
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 Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan regarding the foreign intervention and civilian 
casulties in Libya, 20.03.2011, www.alemarah-iea.net  
9
 Fatwa “Libya after the entry of the Crusader”, answered by Abu Muslim al-Jaza’iri, March 28, 2011, 
www.tawhed.ws  
10
 Fatwa “is the entry of the west in Libya legitimate?”, answered by Abu Mundhir al-Shanqiti, March 
28, 2011, www.tawheed.ws.  
11
 For one account of a Libyan doctor (Salih al-Libi) who fought and served as a medic in the 1980s 
jihad against Soviet troops and the Afghan National Army: Prucha, Nico: ‘Abdallah ‘Azzams Outlook 
for Jihad in 1988 – “al-Jihad between Kabul and Jerusalem”, p.11 ff, 
http://www.rieas.gr/images/nicos2.pdf.  
12
 Al-Qatari, Hamd / Al-Madani, Majid (eds.): Min qisas al-shuhada al-arab fi Busna wa-l Hursk, p.58ff, 
p.115ff, http://saaid.net/book/133.zip.  
13
 Felter, Joseph / Fishman, Brian: al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq – a First Look at the Sinjar 
Records, Harmony Project, CTC at West Point, 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf  
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instructor Abu ‘l-Layth al-Libi in November 2007,14 who would be killed soon after in a US-
drone strike.15 
 
The outbreak of violence in Libya conveniently suits the jihadist propaganda. Finally, one of 
the fiercest enemies, the regime of Qadhafi, does not ‘simply’ bow to the demands of a 
massive social movement. It must be noted that all social movements parallel to their 
protests and demonstrations had been keen to keep the world updated via the use of social 
media outlets such as twitter, Facebook, blogs and YouTube. When the Libyan town of 
Misrata was affected by heavy fighting, AQ broadcasted a speech by Attiyatullah who is 
active inside the jihadi media spectrum since many years, both as a writer16 and as a jihadist 
authority appearing in a number of videos.17 In what can be most likely interpreted as a 
typical blunt propaganda move, Attiyatullah issued a message entitled “Greetings to our 
People in Libya” on 25 February 2011, stating his clear, full name for the first time: Jamal 
Ibrahim Ishtiwiyy al-Misrati. By this, Attiyatullah implies being “one of you” from Misrata and 
subsequently gives out advice to the “sons of the Islamic nation” in order to succumb and 
dispose al-Qadhafi and his regime. Clearly, the regime of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi is yet 
another defined non-Islamic government, ruled by an unjust tyrant, an idol (taghut) led by 
disbelief (kufr) and is part of a greater plan to continue the suppression of Muslims. As noted 
in an earlier message, Attiyatullah, who is “a Libyan member of al-Qaeda since 1989 [and] 
who is now based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region (…) sought to appropriate the recent 
North African uprisings for al-Qaeda.”18 When the presumed merger of LIFG with AQ did not 
create a foothold in Libya, elements such as Attiyatullah now perceive the situation as a new 
chance with the hope to “directly inspire Libyans to create their own local version of al-
Qaeda.”  
 
A similar tactic applies to AQ’s ‘number three’, Abu Yahya al-Libi.  
For several years, Abu Yahya al-Libi has been frequently broadcasting filmed sermons and 
published books from the frontlines of jihad. Being a Libyan as well, Abu Yahya also issued a 
                                                        
14
 Camille Tawil, Libyan Islamists Back Away from al-Qaeda Merger in Reconciliation with Qaddafi 
Regime, June 18, 2009, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35147  
15
 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1978204/posts  
16
 Some of his writings can be retrieved here: http://tawhed.ws/a?a=atiyatal  
17
 The most recent one, a filmed sermon (khutba), was released by as-Sahab on 14 March 2011. “The 
Importance of the Sanctity of Muslim Blood” was published a few days later published in English by 
the Global Islamic Media Front. 
He, for example, was featured in the notorious “Reeh al-janna” series, praising killed Abu ‘l-Layth al-
Libi as a military instructor and a combat veteran in the fields of jihad. 
18
 Benotman, Noman / Brandon, James: Briefing paper: The jihadist threat in Libya, 24 March 2011, 
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/pdfs/libya24march11.pdf  
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message “to our people in Libya.”19 In this speech, he emphasized – as in other jihadi media 
regarding the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt – the will of the people to rid themselves of 
any form of tyranny and oppression, he tries to paint Libya as a new theatre of jihadi actions. 
In the jihadists worldview, there can be “no dignity, no honor without sacrifice”, al-Libi claims 
“the freedom of the Muslim people in Libya consists in the true and sincere implementation of 
sharia-law, the conduct of justice, humanity, mercy and honor.” The only solution, as usual 
according to the jihadi sources, is sought in the installation of a proclaimed religious habitus, 
independently of the reality on the ground. Al-Libi appeals on the legitimacy of ousting 
Qadhafi while portraying the elements of AQ as a kind of ‘avant-garde’ who are fighting for 
the exact same cause – but without popular support, until now. With the increase of violence 
by Qadhafi, Abu Yahya stresses, that the “wish of the Mujahideen for a long time had been to 
incite the Islamic community and of protecting it with the appeal for jihad.” Only by battle can 
freedom be obtained – freedom in the jihadists’ sense means living under the sharia-law as 
interpreted by jihadist sources. As the west in the recent decades has created and installed 
vassal-governments and rulers, all of who are subjected in the jihadists’ worldview belonging 
to a scurrile conspiracy, 20  neither the US nor the EU have any real interest in seeing 
governments serving their interests in the region removed. Furthermore, “these uprisings [in 
the Middle East] have uncovered the fact that western governments do not know anything 
else besides their interests and those of their people”, even though western, democratic 
governments “say to the uprising people, who have been conquered for a long time by 
criminals, ‘we stand with you.’” Abu Yahya has repeated this a number of times in this 
message. “We are saying this is a lesson for our Muslim people, who will not attain the 
freedom or dignity they want and the comfort they seek except by feeling their power of 
themselves.” 
 
The jihadists are both supporting and exploiting the Arab spring21 while in the case of Libya 
three vital factors for the jihadi propaganda are at play. 
One major threat is the North African AQ department. They mainly operate out of Mali, Chad, 
Niger and Algeria and are active in channeling weapons and making money by frequently 
kidnapping westerners. At this stage it may be assumed that fighters are active in Libya with 
the ambition of sending more foreign fighters to Libya to actively support the war against 
Qadhafi. This could lead to the widening of the conflict and yet another long-term battlefield 
in the Arab world. Furthermore, this will perhaps lead to new, inspiring and highly appealing 
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 Kalimat al-shaykh al-mujahid Abu Yahya al-Libi ila ahlina fi Libiyya, as-Sahab (12.03.2011). 
20
 “Christian-Crusader-Zionist-Shiite” descriptions of secret alliances are found frequently in the 
jihadist writings and videos. For an up-to-date example, consult the 353 page long treatise by senior 
jihadi scholar al-Majid: Abd al-Majid, Abd al-Majid: al-Sira’ al-islami al-sahiu-salibi – al-wajha al-haqiqi 
li l-sira’, Silsilat bina’ al-shakhsiyya al-muslima (4), Global Islamic Media Front (2011). 
21
 http://www.economist.com/node/18486089?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter  
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jihad propaganda and videos by an already established AQ group who at the same time has 
the possibility to acquire modern weapon technology from Qadhafi’s caches. 
Another main factor is the narrative of grievances. The jihadi rhetoric and pictures are filled 
with grievances, committing themselves to sacrifice everything to provide security to Muslim 
civilians. As it was already visible in Tunisia, pictures of killed protestors quickly entered the 
jihadi propaganda to underline the criminal nature of regimes AQ is fighting against. And 
now, finally, the population is rising up as well for the same cause. In Libya, particularly 
within the rebel held territories in the East as of now, pictures of killed civilians and mutilated 
corpses, allegedly civilians tortured to death by Qadhafi’s mercenaries, are already at work 
with the call to provide support. A call that AQ propagates to answer. 
And finally, the modus and the role model of the Mujahideen are at play. With armed, 
disorganized and guerrilla styled men in Libya fighting with Kalashnikovs and Rocket 
Propelled Grenades against a technical superior and well organized army, the outlets of the 
jihadi media define them already as Mujahideen. Pictures are being broadcasted from the 
battlefields in Libya of armed men praying before combat – what may be a intercultural and a 
natural habit. This, however, is something that AQ is reclaiming for itself. Therefore, the 
propaganda of AQ is calling out to “raise the flag of Jihad in the Muslim land of Libya” 22 
indicating that jihadist ideology is an essential part of the Muslim fighters in Libya as in 
Afghanistan. The pictures from inside of Libya are thus branded with the rebels being 
perceived within the jihadist media as re-enacting AQ and thereby as living the ‘Islamic’ 
definition of jihadist endeavors – again, AQ is far from reality, but may gain a foothold by its 
active and supportive role in East Libya if they succeed in establishing themselves this time 
properly with local jihadist and with the logistical and ideological backing of the transnational 
active AQ network in North Africa in place. 
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